Strong comparative statics of equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, F; Sabarwal, T
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00548-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 307-314
• 关键词: Comparative statics; computing equilibria; strategic complementarities; supermodular games

摘要

Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and are valid for games of strategic complementarities. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.