Playing safe in coordination games: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Schmidt, D; Shupp, R; Walker, JM; Ostrom, E
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Ball State University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00552-3
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 281-299
• 关键词: Experimental economics; game theory; equilibrium selection; Risk dominance; Payoff dominance

摘要

This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.