Admissibility and common belief
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Asheim, GB; Dufwenberg, M
署名单位：
University of Oslo; Stockholm University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00551-1
发表日期：
2003
页码：
208-234
关键词：
摘要：
The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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