Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Núñez, M; Rafels, C
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00054-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 311-331
• 关键词: extreme core allocations; assignment game; reduced marginal worth vectors; Convex games

摘要

A characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game is given in terms of the reduced marginal worth vectors. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his or her marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his or her predecessors. This set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is proved to be the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game. Therefore, although assignment games are hardly ever convex, the same characterization of extreme core allocations is valid for convex games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.