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作者：Moldovanu, B
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作者：Board, O
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230], and used to analyze rational play in extens...
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作者：Morris, S; Ui, T
作者单位：Yale University; Yokohama National University
摘要：Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some potential game arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equiva...
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作者：Cason, TN; Saijo, T; Yamato, T; Yokotani, K
作者单位：University of Osaka; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributin...
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作者：Roughgarden, T; Tardos, É
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a best possible outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the player...
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作者：Cox, JC
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between...
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作者：Kirchkamp, O; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals. Theoretically, the English auction yields efficient allocations, while other standard auction formats fail to do so. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that an English auction yields significantly mor...
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作者：Kukushkin, NS
作者单位：Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS
摘要：If in a finite strategic game all strategies axe scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners' choices, and one of three single crossing conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a Nash equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dubey, P; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures of others' strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced play of the game. We show that, for generic payoffs, the outcome of the game becomes stationary, and is consistent with Nash equilibrium. In general, if payoffs have ties or if players observe more of each others' strategies...
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作者：Muthoo, A
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysi...
