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作者：Holzman, R; Monderer, D
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sandroni, A; Smorodinsky, R
作者单位：Northwestern University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a new solution concept for short-sighted players engaging in a repeated interaction: a Belief-based equilibrium (BBE). In a BBE, players optimize myopically given their beliefs which are not necessarily correct, but are not contradicted by the data. We show that, if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium then the play of a BBE resembles a Nash equilibrium play. However, a BBE may not be a Nash equilibrium. In particular, in a BBE players may play deterministically when...
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作者：Blume, A; Arnold, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
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作者：Solan, E; Yariv, L
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We consider normal form games in which two players decide on their strategies before the start of play and Player I can purchase noisy information about his opponent's decisions concerning future response policies (i.e., spy on his opponent). We give a full characterization of the set of distributions over the players' payoffs that can be induced by such equilibria, as well as describe their welfare and Pareto properties. In 2 x 2 games we find three equilibrium phenomena: (i) when the game is...
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作者：Yokoo, M; Sakurai, Y; Matsubara, S
作者单位：NTT, Inc
摘要：We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (...
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作者：Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a fi...
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作者：Kibris, Ö
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：A bargaining rule is ordinally invariant if its solutions are independent of which utility functions are chosen to represent the agents' preferences. For two agents, only dictatorial bargaining rules satisfy this property (Shapley, L., La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, Editions du CNRS (1969) 25 1). For three agents, we construct a normalized subclass of problems through which an infinite variety of such rules can be defined. We then analyze the implications of var...
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作者：Amorós, P
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga
摘要：We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Çelen, B; Kariv, S
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We explore Bayes-rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities, where each decision maker observes only her predecessor's binary action. Under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions. Under imperfect information, in contrast, beliefs and actions cycle forever. However, despite the stochastic instability, over time the private information is ignored and decision mak...
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice-in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out-surpris...
