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作者：Hernando-Veciana, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with mort information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success ...
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作者：Barua, R; Chakravarty, SR; Roy, S; Sarkar, P
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show that: (1) generic 2 x 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2) generic two-player ...
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作者：Burton, A; Sefton, M
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We report an experiment with a 3 x 3 game with a unique and efficient equilibrium. However, each player's equilibrium strategy may result in a very low payoff if the other player does not use her equilibrium strategy. Players can avoid this possibility by playing an alternative safe strategy. When players have no opportunity for pre-play communication over 80% of subjects choose the safe strategy. However, we observe substantial increases in the amount of equilibrium play when (i) the riskines...
