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作者：Blume, A; Arnold, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
摘要：We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive ali...
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作者：Dutta, B; Kar, A
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Heifetz, A; Segev, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The experimental evidence on the endowment effect [Kahneman et al., J. Polit. Economy 98 (1990) 1325-1348] and the self serving bias in negotiations [Babcok and Loewenstein, J. Econ. Perspect. 11 (1997) 1337-1343] suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand vis-a-vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When the inherent toughness of the bargainer is observed by the opponent, this oppo...
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作者：O'Neill, B; Samet, D; Wiener, Z; Winter, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash so...
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper introduces a new model of environments with a large number of agents and stochastic characteristics. We consider sequences of finite but increasingly large economies that 'discretize' the continuum. In the limit we obtain a model that is continuum-like in important respects, yet it has a countable set of agents with a finitely additive, 'uniform' distribution. In this model, the law of large numbers is meaningful and holds on all subintervals. This framework provides, among other th...
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作者：Stanford, W
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：In randomly selected large finite normal form games, pure strategy strongly individually rational outcomes (all payoffs exceeding pure strategy minimax payoffs) exist with high probability. As a corollary, pure strategy Nash equilibria also exist with high probability in certain infinitely repeated games. Specifically, the pure strategy Folk Theorem, which can be true in a vacuous sense, has nontrivial substance with probability approaching one as pure strategy sets increase in cardinality, pr...
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作者：Hain, R; Mitra, M
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute
摘要：In this paper we analyze simple sequencing problems under incomplete information and interdependent costs. We prove the necessity of concave cost function for implementability of such problems. Implementability means that one can achieve aggregate cost minimization in expost equilibrium. We also show that simple sequencing problems are implementable if and only if the mechanism is a 'generalized VCG mechanism.' We then consider first best implementability, that is implementability with budget ...
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作者：Dufwenberg, M; Kirchsteiger, G
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Arizona
摘要：Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution ...
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作者：Ballester, C
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In this paper, we show that there are natural limitations in attaining stability in cooperative environments. These limitations are related to the fact that the time required to obtain a stable partition of the players can grow exponentially, even under very simple assumptions on the preferences over partners. These difficulties arise even when players assess potential coalitions based solely on their size. For this purpose, we demonstrate that the core, the Nash stable set and the individuall...
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作者：Archer, A; Feigenbaum, J; Krishnamurthy, A; Sami, R; Shenker, S
作者单位：Yale University; Cornell University
摘要：We investigate multicast cost sharing from both computational and economic perspectives. Recent work in economics leads to the consideration of two mechanisms: marginal cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof. Subsequent work in computer science shows that the MC mechanism can be computed with only two modest-sized messages per link of the multicast tree but that computing the SH mechanism for p potential receive...
