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作者：Di Tillio, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131-148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are ra...
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作者：Albizuri, MJ; Zarzuelo, JM
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games (Owen, 1977), and we define and study coalitional semivalues, which are generalizations of semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 198 1). (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Stegeman, M; Rhode, P
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of stochastic Darwinian dynamics in quadratic games. Each player's strategy adjusts through mutation and selection shocks, and stability is independent of the rates at which these shocks arrive. Given stability, we characterize the midpoint of the nondegenerate ergodic distribution. In small populations, some equilibria correspond to relative payoff maximization, but others are unanticipated by existing static concepts. In the ...
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作者：Diamantoudi, E; Miyagawa, E; Xue, LC
作者单位：Columbia University; Concordia University - Canada; McGill University
摘要：This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generaliz...
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作者：Schummer, J
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing small gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the rel...
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作者：Pápai, S
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures in a simple coalition formation model, for which specific coalition formation games, such as the marriage and roommate models, are special cases that are obtained by restricting the coalitions that may form. The main result is a characterization of collections of permissible coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure in the corresponding coalition formation model. In particular, we show that only single...
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作者：Mutuswami, S; Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Essex; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：In this paper, we consider a local public goods environment. The agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. We propose a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The sub-game perfect equilibria of the mechanism generate efficient outcomes. We also show how to adapt the mechanism to network economies where the economic activity takes place via the formation of links. (C...
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作者：Holzman, R; Kfir-Dahav, N; Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Sigma. The Sigma-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions, in which the buyers choose strategies that involve bidding only on bundles in Sigma, and ...
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作者：Friedman, E; Shor, M; Shenker, S; Sopher, B
作者单位：Cornell University; Vanderbilt University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play tends toward the Stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player. Convergence is significantly more robust for a serial cost sharing game...
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作者：Spiegler, R
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their...
