Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Holzman, R; Monderer, D
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001
发表日期：
2004
页码：
87-103
关键词：
摘要：
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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