Belief-based equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandroni, A; Smorodinsky, R
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00152-0
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 157-171
• 关键词: equilibrium; calibration; rationality; learning

摘要

We introduce a new solution concept for short-sighted players engaging in a repeated interaction: a Belief-based equilibrium (BBE). In a BBE, players optimize myopically given their beliefs which are not necessarily correct, but are not contradicted by the data. We show that, if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium then the play of a BBE resembles a Nash equilibrium play. However, a BBE may not be a Nash equilibrium. In particular, in a BBE players may play deterministically when the only Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.