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作者：Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We construct an Uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know that there are other players in the game and that payoffs are determined through other players' acti...
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作者：Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Karp, Larry; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton
摘要：We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty. (c) ...
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作者：Viossat, Yannick
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4 x 4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sotomayor, Marilda
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market. Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core...
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作者：Andreoni, James; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Columbia University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence prov...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf
作者单位：Maastricht University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We consider socially structured transferable utility games. For every coalition the relative strength of a player is measured by a power function. The socially stable core consists of the socially and economically stable payoff vectors. It is non-empty if the game itself is socially stable. The socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core. Generically, it consists of a finite number of payoff vectors. Convex TU-games have a non-empty socially stable core, irrespective ...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter's location, conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium are provided...
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作者：Sandbu, Martin Eiliv
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Experimental investigations of preferences for fairness reveal systematic set-dependence in people's allocative choices: Choices over identical options can be reversed by strategically irrelevant changes in the set of possible outcomes of the larger game. Set-dependent choice behavior is often thought to reflect reciprocity motives, the desire to reward good intentions and punish bad ones. This paper investigates set dependence in unilateral decision problems, where reciprocity motives cannot ...
