Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
署名单位：
University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.004
发表日期：
2007
页码：
1-29
关键词：
摘要：
This paper formulates and analyzes a general model of elections in which candidates receive private signals about voters' preferences prior to committing to political platforms. We fully characterize the unique pure-strategy equilibrium: After receiving her signal, each candidate locates at the median of the distribution of the median voter's location, conditional on the other candidate receiving the same signal. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium are provided. Though the electoral game exhibits discontinuous payoffs for the candidates, we prove that mixed strategy equilibria exist generally, that equilibrium expected payoffs are continuous in the parameters of the model, and that mixed strategy equilibria are upper hemicontinuous. This allows us to study the robustness of the median voter theorem to private information: Pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist in models close to the Downsian model, but mixed strategy equilibria must, and they will be close to the Downsian equilibrium. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.