Fairness and the roads not taken: An experimental test of non-reciprocal set-dependence in distributive preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sandbu, Martin Eiliv
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 113-130
• 关键词: fairness; set-dependence; RECIPROCITY; Dictator games; truncated games; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; reference-dependent utility functions; state-dependent utility functions

摘要

Experimental investigations of preferences for fairness reveal systematic set-dependence in people's allocative choices: Choices over identical options can be reversed by strategically irrelevant changes in the set of possible outcomes of the larger game. Set-dependent choice behavior is often thought to reflect reciprocity motives, the desire to reward good intentions and punish bad ones. This paper investigates set dependence in unilateral decision problems, where reciprocity motives cannot be at work. By examining truncated dictator games-dictator games with constrained budgets-I document choice reversals that are systematically related to changes in the available set, yet cannot be explained by the desire to reciprocate intentions. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.