The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Viossat, Yannick
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 397-407
• 关键词: replicator dynamics; correlated equilibrium; Rock-paper-scissors

摘要

It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4 x 4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.