-
作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A theorem on existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous zero-sum games is proved and applied to three models of elections. First, the existence theorem yields a mixed strategy equilibrium in the multidimensional spatial model of elections with three voters. A nine-voter example shows that a key condition of the existence theorem is violated for general finite numbers of voters and illustrates an obstacle to a general result. Second, the theorem provides a simple and self-contained...
-
作者：Aliprantis, C. D.; Camera, G.; Puzzello, D.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
摘要：We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational constraints. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Cassar, Alessandra
作者单位：University of San Francisco
摘要：A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with avera...
-
作者：Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents-which has positive implicatio...
-
作者：Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; New York University
摘要：In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior...
-
作者：Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless ...
-
作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Maastricht University
摘要：We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vale's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to s...
-
作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full-dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work. It also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full-dimensionality condition fail, as in the strongly symmetric equi...
-
作者：Chang, Chih; Hu, Chcng-Cheng
作者单位：Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：The initiating points of the current paper are the axiomatic characterizations, in terms of consistency, of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost value (by Moulin), the Shapley value (by Hart and Mas-Colell), and the prenucleolus (by Orshan). The basic axioms are the same, but three different reduced games can be used to distinguish these three solutions. The main purpose of the paper is to illustrate that besides the definitions of reduced games are different, the axiom converse consisten...
-
作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Segev, Ella; Talley, Eric
作者单位：Open University Israel; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southern California; RAND Corporation
摘要：This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context. Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in the structure and/or organization o...
