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作者：Izquierdo, Luis R.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Gotts, Nicholas M.; Polhill, J. Gary
作者单位：Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid; James Hutton Institute
摘要：Reinforcement learners tend to repeat actions that led to satisfactory outcomes in the past, and avoid choices that resulted in unsatisfactory experiences. This behavior is one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms in nature. In this paper we fully characterize the dynamics of one of the best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning [Bush, R., Mosteller, F., 1955. Stochastic Models of Learning. Wiley & Sons, New York] for 2-player 2-strategy games. We also provide some extensio...
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作者：John, Morgan; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the value of commitment in sequential contests when the follower faces small costs to observe the leader's effort. We show that the value of commitment vanishes entirely in this class of games. By contrast, in sequential tournaments-games where, at a cost, the follower can observe the effectiveness of the leader's effort-the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Agastya, Murali; Menezes, Ham; Sengupta, Kunal
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Queensland
摘要：Rarely, if ever. do parties contemplating a joint project commit resources without engaging in nonbindin- discussions about who does what. To examine the role of such discussions, we model the investment decision as a voluntary contribution game where each player is privately informed of her benefit from project's completion. Efficiency of every equilibrium of this game is improved when a prior stage of communication is allowed. Interestingly, this improvement can be achieved in simple equilib...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders. even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test ...
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作者：Benoit, Jean Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Rerazi
作者单位：New York University; Istanbul Bilgi University
摘要：We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (f...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 E...
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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the ...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Fictitious Play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for several classes of games, including weighted potential games, supertroodular games with diminishing returns, and 3 x 3 supermodular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence of Continuous-time Fictitious Play for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with dimi...
