A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 46-71
• 关键词: Two-sided matching; college admission problem; STABILITY; core; coalition formation; simple matchings

摘要

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.