Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Andreoni, James; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo
署名单位：
Columbia University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.003
发表日期：
2007
页码：
240-259
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence provides strong support for the theory, and sheds light on the roles of risk aversion and the spite motive in first- and second-price auctions, respectively. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.