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作者：Callandera, Steven; Wilkie, Simon
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southern California
摘要：Despite a pervasive presence in politics, lying has not traditionally played a role in formal models of elections. In this paper we develop a model that allows candidates in the campaign stage to misrepresent their policy intentions if elected to office, and in which the willingness to lie varies across candidates. We find that candidates more willing to lie are favored, but that this advantage is limited by the electoral mechanism and to such an extent that more honest candidates win a signif...
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作者：Smith, Trenton G.; Tasnadi, Attila
作者单位：Washington State University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an indepth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unco...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of 2 x 2 games, provided such equilibria exist. We identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion. We find that (at least moderate degrees of) risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Maastricht University
摘要：A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang [Cai, H., Wang, J., 2006. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econ. Behav. 95, 384-394] on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show in a simple sender-receiver ...
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作者：Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma
作者单位：University of Toyama; Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We derive some simple formulas for limiting stationary distributions for models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy population games. As an application of these formulas, we investigate the robustness of equilibrium selection results to the assumption that the level of noise in agents' choice rules is vanishingly small. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sen, Debapriya; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators. It is shown that for any nondrastic innovation (a) the license is practically sold to all firms, ensuring full diffusion of the innovation, (b) consumers are better off, firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved, (c) the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations, (d) compar...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Friedman, Daniel; Gjerstad, Steven
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. (c) 2006 Els...
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作者：Stoltz, Gilles; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Hart and Schmeidler's extension of correlated equilibrium to games with infinite sets of strategies is studied. General properties of the set of correlated equilibria are described. It is shown that, just like for finite games, if all players play according to an appropriate regret-minimizing strategy then the empirical frequencies of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria whenever the strategy sets are convex and compact.(c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Montrucchio, Luigi; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin
摘要：We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results abo...
