The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brindisi, Francesco; Celen, Bogachan; Hyndman, Kyle
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.018
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 264-281
• 关键词: coordination; delay; INFORMATION; global games; experiment

摘要

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high beliefs about the state of the economy undertakes an investment without delay. This decision (potentially) triggers an investment by the other player whose beliefs would have led to inaction otherwise. Endogenous timing has two distinct effects on coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate strategic uncertainty for late movers). The experiments that we conduct to test these theoretical results show that the learning effect of timing has more impact on the subjects' behavior than the complementarity effect. We also observe that subjects' welfare improves significantly under endogenous timing. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.