Pandering and electoral competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gratton, Gabriele
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 163-179
• 关键词: Pandering; ELECTIONS; information aggregation

摘要

We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters' optimal policy. The model is extended to include strategic voting, policy-motivated candidates, imperfectly informed candidates, and heterogeneous preferences. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.