Optimal truncation in matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, Peter; Shorrer, Ran
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 591-615
• 关键词: Matching; deferred acceptance; Truncation; market design; manipulation

摘要

Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mandian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). Our results demonstrate that in large, uniform markets using the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each woman's best response to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list substantially. In fact, the optimal degree of truncation for such a woman goes to 100% of her list as the market size grows large. In general one-to-one markets we provide comparative statics for optimal truncation strategies: reduction in risk aversion and reduced correlation across preferences each lead agents to truncate more. So while several recent papers focused on the limits of strategic manipulation, our results serve as a reminder that without preconditions ensuring truthful reporting, there exists a potential for significant manipulation even in settings where agents have little information. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.