Network games under strategic complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belhaj, Mohamed; Bramoulle, Yann; Deroian, Frederic
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 310-319
• 关键词: Network games; strategic complementarities; centrality; uniqueness; interdependence

摘要

We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a higher action in equilibrium. We finally analyze comparative statics. We show that a shock may not propagate throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.