Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 624-630
• 关键词: Sequential mechanisms; Stable outcomes; Multiple applications; irreversibility

摘要

In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.