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作者：Chaturvedi, Rakesh
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Udaipur (IIMU)
摘要：A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Okada (1996). This mechanism is used to analyze the coalitional setting of strictly supermodular games. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. Thus the institutional feature of 'every responder has veto power' is relaxed here. It is shown that for all suffi...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be wi...
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作者：Balmaceda, Felipe
摘要：This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than the equivalent profile under specialization. The principal prefers multit...
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作者：Castillo, Marco; Dianat, Ahrash
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a truncation of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often...
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作者：Tamura, Shohei
作者单位：Tohoku University
摘要：We study the problem of selecting prize winners from a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such rules. We show that the set consists of exa...
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作者：Buisseret, Peter; Prato, Carlo
作者单位：University of Chicago; Georgetown University; Georgetown University
摘要：We develop a model of electoral control in which politicians in a legislative body allocate their time between providing constituency services to their voters, and pursuing the objectives of legislative cliques and factions. While a politician's human capital symmetrically increases his inherent ability to engage in both endeavors, our analysis uncovers an equilibrium bias towards the latter. As a result of the strategic interdependencies among legislators, a trade-off arises between politicia...
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作者：Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical suppo...
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作者：Khalmetski, Kiryl
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether subjects tend to meet the expectations of others (the guilt aversion hypothesis). The specificity of our approach is that second order beliefs are manipulated exogenously just by changing the parameters of the experimental game. In particular, we consider a simple communication game where the sender is perfectly informed about his material benefit from lying to the receiver. At the same time, the receiver knows only the ex-ante distribution of...
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作者：Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia; Gordon, Sidartha
作者单位：Montclair State University; University of Connecticut; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
摘要：We examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibr...
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作者：Manjunath, Vikram
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：I take a decentralized approach to fractional matching with and without money. For the model with money I define and show the existence of competitive equilibria. For the model without money, while competitive equilibria may not exist, I define a version of approximate equilibrium and show existence. From a welfare standpoint, I show that equilibrium allocations are in the core. Similarly, approximate equilibrium allocations are in the approximate version of the core. Published by Elsevier Inc.
