On the operation of multiple matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu
• 署名单位: University of Tsukuba
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 166-185
• 关键词: Market design; strategy-proofness; Second-best incentive compatibility; Top trading cycles rules; Deferred acceptance rules

摘要

We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.