2016

最新文章

• Local incentive compatibility with transfers AI翻译
  作者：Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik
  作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
  摘要：We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. We identify a rich class of type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible. Payment-only incentive compatibilit...
• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics AI翻译
  作者：Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
  作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Lausanne
  摘要：We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed priorities, over agents. We show that DA-mechanisms ar...
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability AI翻译
  作者：Balmaceda, Felipe; Balseiro, Santiago R.; Correa, Jose R.; Stier-Moses, Nicolas E.
  作者单位：Duke University; Universidad de Chile; Columbia University; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
  摘要：We study a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort level spaces. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. Quantifying welfare loss as the ratio between the first-best social welfare and that arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract, we provide simple parametric bounds for problem instances with moral hazard. Relying on that, we compute the worst case welfare loss ratio among all problem instances with...
• Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems AI翻译
  作者：Dogan, Battal; Yildiz, Kemal
  作者单位：University of Lausanne; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
  摘要：We study marriage problems where two groups of agents, men and women, match each other and probabilistic assignments are possible. When only ordinal preferences are observable, stochastic dominance efficiency (sd-efficiency) is commonly used. First, we provide a characterization of sd-efficient allocations in terms of a property of an order relation defined on the set of man-woman pairs. Then, using this characterization, we constructively prove that for each probabilistic assignment that is s...
• Political disagreement and information in elections AI翻译
  作者：Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
  作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
  摘要：We study the role of re-election concerns in incumbent parties' incentives to shape the information that reaches voters. In a probabilistic voting model, candidates representing two groups of voters compete for office. In equilibrium, the candidate representing the majority wins with a probability that increases in the degree of political disagreement the difference in expected payoffs from the candidates' policies. Prior to the election, the office-motivated incumbent party (IP) can influence...
• Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence AI翻译
  作者：Mimra, Wanda; Rasch, Alexander; Waibel, Christian
  作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
  摘要：In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Because experts provide both the diagnosis and the treatment, there is opportunity for fraud. We experimentally investigate how the intensity of price competition and the level of customer information about past expert behavior influence experts' incentives to defraud their customers when experts can build up reputation. We show that the level of fraud is significantly hi...
• A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games AI翻译
  作者：Chong, Juin-Kuan; Ho, Teck-Hua; Camerer, Colin
  作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
  摘要：Subjects in simple games frequently exhibit non-equilibrium behaviors. Cognitive hierarchy (CH) and level k (LK) are two prevailing structural models that capture such behaviors well. This paper proposes a generalized CH (GCH) model that nests a variant of the LK model, called LM. GCH differs from CH in two ways. First, each lower level's actual frequency is exponentially weighted with a to form level-k's belief on relative proportions; alpha captures stereotype bias. CH assumes no stereotype ...
• Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships AI翻译
  作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Lewis, Tracy R.
  摘要：An advocate for a special interest provides advice to a planner, who subsequently makes a sequence of decisions. The advocate is interested only in advancing his cause and will distort his advice to manipulate the planner's choices. Each time she acts the planner observes the result, providing a signal that corroborates or contradicts the advocate's recommendation. Without commitment, no influential communication takes place. With commitment, the planner can exploit the information that is rev...
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players AI翻译
  作者：Zapal, Jan
  作者单位：Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
  摘要：The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal poli...
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations AI翻译
  作者：He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
  作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
  摘要：This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of independent types, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. (C) 2016 Elsevier ...