Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Castillo, Marco; Dianat, Ahrash
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 180-196
• 关键词: Two-sided matching; Truncation strategies; experiments

摘要

We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the degree to which agents strategically misrepresent their preferences by submitting a truncation of their true preferences. Our experimental design uses a restricted environment in which a particular form of truncation is always a best response. We find that subjects do not truncate their preferences more often when truncation is profitable. They do, however, truncate their preferences less often when truncation is dangerous - that is, when there is a risk of over-truncating and remaining unmatched. Our findings suggest that behavioral insights can play an important role in the field of market design. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.