Fractional matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manjunath, Vikram
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 321-336
• 关键词: Fractional matching; competitive equilibrium

摘要

I take a decentralized approach to fractional matching with and without money. For the model with money I define and show the existence of competitive equilibria. For the model without money, while competitive equilibria may not exist, I define a version of approximate equilibrium and show existence. From a welfare standpoint, I show that equilibrium allocations are in the core. Similarly, approximate equilibrium allocations are in the approximate version of the core. Published by Elsevier Inc.