Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chaturvedi, Rakesh
• 署名单位: Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Udaipur (IIMU)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.012
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 125-141
• 关键词: Bargaining; coalitions; Nash bargaining solution; core; Veto power

摘要

A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Okada (1996). This mechanism is used to analyze the coalitional setting of strictly supermodular games. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. Thus the institutional feature of 'every responder has veto power' is relaxed here. It is shown that for all sufficiently high discount factors delta, there exists an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies (SSPE) whose limiting outcome is the core-constrained Nash Bargaining Solution. Moreover, all efficient SSPE are payoff-equivalent in the limit as delta -> 1. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.