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作者：Di Pei, Harry
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I examine the payoff consequences for a player when she removes a subset of her opponent's actions before playing a two-player complete information normal form game. When she faces a constraint on the maximal number of actions she can remove, she can be strictly better off by not removing any actions. I present such an example. I also establish sufficient conditions under which removing opponent's actions cannot hurt. As a corollary, I also characterize a necessary condition for a player's opt...
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作者：Zhang, Boyu; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：Beijing Normal University; University of Vienna
摘要：The notion of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), has been widely used to explain experimental data. In this paper, we use quantal response equilibrium as a 'homotopy method for equilibrium selection, and study this in detail for 2 x 2 bimatrix coordination games. We show that the risk dominant equilibrium need not be selected. In the logarithmic game, the limiting QRE is the Nash equilibrium with the larger sum of square root payoffs. Finally, we app...
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作者：Piermont, Evan; Takeoka, Norio; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We take the Krepsian approach to provide a behavioral foundation for responsive subjective learning processes. In contrast to the standard subjective state space models, the resolution of uncertainty regarding the true state is endogenous and depends on the decision maker's actions. There need not be full resolution of uncertainty between periods. When the decision maker chooses what to consume, she also chooses the information structure to which she will be exposed. When she consumes outcomes...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich; Gruene, Ansgar
摘要：Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation in large groups where partners meet only once. The first model for which this has been demonstrated was the image scoring mechanism. But analytical work on the simplest possible case, the binary scoring model, has shown that even small errors in implementation destabilize any cooperative regime. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, as...
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作者：Hota, Ashish R.; Garg, Siddharth; Sundaram, Shreyas
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; New York University; University of Waterloo
摘要：We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making under such uncertainty, we model each player's risk preference according to the value function from prospect theory. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous risk preferences and under certain assumptions on the rate of return and failure probability of the r...
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作者：Horan, Sean; Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We propose an axiomatic approach to the problem of deriving a (linear) welfare ordering from a choice function. Admissibility requires that the ordering assigned to a rational choice function is the one that rationalizes it. Neutrality states that the solution covaries with permutations of the alternatives. Persistence stipulates that the ordering assigned to two choice functions is also assigned to every choice function in between. We prove that these properties characterize the sequential so...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Neururer, Daniel
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Innsbruck
摘要：This paper experimentally isolates the impact of various combinations of the following motives on trustworthiness: (i) unconditional other-regarding preferences; (ii) vulnerability responsiveness; (iii) deal-responsiveness; and (iv) gift-responsiveness. Our results indicate that - besides unconditional other-regarding preferences like altruism and inequality aversion - vulnerability-responsiveness is the most important driver for trustworthiness. Prompted by our experimental findings we provid...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Kim, Semin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yonsei University
摘要：A voting rule f is self-stable (Barbera and Jackson, 2004) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f, where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barbera and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a characterization of self-stability in this setup, which shows that only few rules of a very particula...
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作者：Badia, Bruno D.; Tumendemberel, Biligbaatar
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider the problem facing the patentee of a technology that may be used to reduce the costs of firms in an industry. The technology's ability to cut costs depends on a use for it being discovered and the patentee has the option of trying to discover the use before licensing the technology to the firms. Should the patentee try? To answer this question, we model the interaction between the patentee and the firms as a game in extensive form. The first move in the game belongs to the patentee...
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作者：Cingiz, Kutay; Flesch, Janos; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the literature on time-inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive epsilon-equilibrium and sophisticated epsilon-equilibrium. We show the existence of both naive and sophisticated epsilon-equilibria for each positive epsilon. Under the assumption that the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous, we furthermore show th...
