Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tamura, Shohei
• 署名单位: Tohoku University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 41-46
• 关键词: Institutional design; Award rules; Conflict of interest; impartiality; Plurality correspondence

摘要

We study the problem of selecting prize winners from a group of experts when each expert nominates another expert for the prize. A nomination rule determines the set of winners on the basis of the profile of nominations; the rule is impartial if one's nomination never influences one's own chance of winning the prize. In this paper, we consider impartial, anonymous, symmetric, and monotonic nomination rules and characterize the set of all minimal such rules. We show that the set consists of exactly one nomination rule: a natural variant of the plurality correspondence called plurality with runners-up. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.