Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.011
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 186-207
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; Telecom markets; Spiteful biding; Raising rivals' cost

摘要

Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have recently been used around the world to allocate mobile telecom spectrum. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for strategic bidding. This paper shows, however, that bidding truthfully does not constitute an equilibrium if bidders also have an incentive to engage in spiteful bidding to raise rivals' cost. The restrictions on further bids imposed by the clock phase of a CCA give certainty to bidders that certain bids above value cannot be winning bids, assisting bidders to engage in spiteful bidding. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.