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作者：Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian
作者单位：Justus Liebig University Giessen; University of Hamburg; University of Hamburg; Justus Liebig University Giessen
摘要：We investigate a repeated public good game with group size two and stranger matching. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period, participants receive information regarding the evaluation of the previous period. Evaluations are subjective judgments, hence our reputation system allows for some degree of noise. There are two information treatments: Each participant receives information either about her partner's...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Brill, Markus; Suksompong, Warut
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Duke University; Stanford University
摘要：In the early 1950s Lloyd Shapley proposed an ordinal and set-valued solution concept for zero-sum games called weak saddle. We show that all weak saddles of a given zero-sum game are interchangeable and equivalent. As a unique set-based value. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Schenone, Pablo
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper takes the Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) framework, in which subjective beliefs over subjective states cannot be identified, and proves a conjecture made in their paper: if the Bernoulli utility functions are additively separable and one of the terms is state-independent, then beliefs are uniquely identified. The main departure from existing literature is that beliefs are identified without imposing extra objective elements into the model. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Featherstone, Clayton R.; Niederle, Muriel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：While much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness, recent research has aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non-truthtelling equilibria. We address two issues that arise from this approach. We first show that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition, agents fail to reach non-truthtelling equilibria. We offer another way forward: implementing truth-telling as an ordinal Bayes-Nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equi...
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作者：Lim, Wooyoung; Neary, Philip R.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large population coordination game, the Language Game of Neary (2012), in which actions are strategic complements and two homogeneous groups have differing preferences over equilibria. We find that subject behaviour is highly consistent with the myopic best response learning rule with deviations from this rule that are (...
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作者：Riis, Christian
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：In the important contribution All pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes published in Minchuk and Sela (2014), the authors analyze an all pay auction with multiple prizes. The specific feature of the model is that all valuations are common except for the valuation of one of the prizes, for which contestants have private valuations. However, the equilibrium characterization derived in the paper is incorrect. This paper provides the correct equilibrium characterization of the model. (C) ...
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作者：Shao, Ran
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：This paper analyzes the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations, such as men and women. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that, absent any friction, positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations are sorted into a finite number of classes and then randomly matched within these classes. We derive upper bounds on the fraction of the total efficiency loss of n-class coarse matching, which is ...
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作者：Cadsby, C. Bram; Du, Ninghua; Wang, Ruqu; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：University of Guelph; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Queens University - Canada; Zhejiang University; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：Will generous return policies in auctions benefit bidders? We investigate this issue using second-price common-value auctions. Theoretically, we find that the symmetric bidding equilibrium is unique unless returns are free, and when returns are free there exist multiple equilibria with different implications for sellers. Moreover, more generous return policies mitigate the winner's curse, but also push the bids higher, thus hurting bidders by eroding their surplus. In the experiment, bids incr...
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作者：Dogan, Battal
作者单位：University of Lausanne
摘要：We show that a simple game form, which resembles the Divide-and-Choose procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution on domains of economies where the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (an allocation obtained from a feasible allocation by interchanging the bundles of any two agents is also feasible) and preferences are complete (each agent can compare any two bundles). Our result extends a result by Thomson (2005) and it is applicable to a wide class of models including the classical ...
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作者：Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Monash University
摘要：It is widely accepted among axiomatic bargaining theorists that if one bargainer is more risk averse than a second, the second will be a tougher bargaining opponent than the first against all opponents. We argue that this relationship between risk aversion and bargaining toughness is both highly fragile, and more nuanced than previously articulated. In the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining frameworks, we establish that when a bargainer is compared with a second who is almost globally more ...
