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作者：Bayer, Ralph-Christopher
作者单位：University of Adelaide
摘要：If either property rights or institutions are weak, agents who create wealth by cooperating will later have an incentive to fight over the distribution of it. In this paper we investigate theoretically and experimentally the circumstances under which welfare losses from investment in distributional contests destroy welfare gains from voluntary cooperation. We find that in situations, where the return to cooperation is high, subjects cooperate strongly and welfare exceeds the predicted non-coop...
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作者：Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：I examine bid behavior in uniform-price auctions and multi-unit Vickrey auctions, without the standard quasilinearity restriction on bidder preferences. Instead of assuming quasilinearity, I assume that bidders have weakly positive wealth effects, i.e. the goods are normal goods. My setting nests quasilinearity, but also allows for budget constraints, financial constraints, and risk aversion. I show that without the quasilinearity restriction, truthful reporting is not a dominant strategy in t...
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作者：Joshi, Sumit; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber
作者单位：George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：The extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target. In contrast, this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents. The sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links (execute multi-link cuts) to the target and her allies. Efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture. We characterize the structural properties of netw...
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作者：Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Ramer, Roald; Schram, Arthur
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; European University Institute
摘要：We study how the formality of a bargaining procedure affects its outcome. We compare a formal Baron-Ferejohn bargaining procedure to an informal procedure where players make and accept proposals in continuous time. Both constitute non-cooperative games corresponding to the same bargaining problem: a three-player median voter setting with an external disagreement point. This allows us to study formality in the presence and absence of a core and provides a natural explanation for the effects of ...
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作者：Nembua, Chameni C.; Wendji, Miamo C.
摘要：The paper examines the assessment of inequality in TU-games when individual payoffs are modeled using a notion of value. Especially, it studies inequality that affects the payoffs of Linear, Efficient and Symmetric values (LES values). We use the Pigou-Dalton transfers principle and the Lorenz criterion to compare LES values of weakly linear games (Freixas, 2010) and shed light on transfers of payoffs that may result from substituting a given LES value for another. We also characterize weak li...
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作者：Bo, Inacio
摘要：Many school districts have objectives regarding how students of different races, ethnicity or religious backgrounds should be distributed across schools. A growing literature in mechanism design is introducing school choice mechanisms that attempt to satisfy those requirements. We show that mechanisms based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance may fail to satisfy those objectives, but that by using instead the school proposing deferred acceptance together with a choice function used by...
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作者：Nunnari, Salvatore; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：Bocconi University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We investigate the implications of imperfect best response in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF) - in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behav...
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作者：Manjunath, Vikram; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：When groups of schools within a single district run their admission processes independently of one another, the resulting match is often inefficient: many children are left unmatched and seats are left unfilled. We study the problem of re-matching students to take advantage of these empty seats in a context where there are priorities to respect. We propose an iterative way in which each group may independently match and re-match students to its schools. The advantages of this process are that ...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Rigotti, Luca; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We provide evidence on how cooperation rates vary across payoff parameters in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), using four one-shot games that differ only in the payoffs from mutual cooperation. In our experiment, participants play only the PD game, and play the game once and only once, so there are no potential confounds or methodological issues. Our results show that higher monetary payoffs from cooperation are associated with substantially higher cooperation rates, which increase monotonically f...
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作者：Suzuki, Toru
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：A seller wants a buyer to choose a good whose value is the seller's private information. The buyer's memory is limited, and she decides whether to remember the good conditional on a signal about the value. The seller then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the buyer of the good. Since the reminder could convey the seller's private information in equilibrium, whether to send a reminder is a non-trivial question. It is shown that costless messages can be informative in eq...
