Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 19-29
• 关键词: Backwards induction; Subgame perfection; Large extensive form games; perfect information; One-shot deviation principle

摘要

In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combinations fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topological) assumptions. This equivalence is in the form of a one-shot deviation principle for large games, which requires lower semi-continuous preferences. As corollaries we obtain one-shot deviation principles for particular classes of games, when each player moves only finitely often or when preferences are representable by payoff functions that are continuous at infinity. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.