Competitive pricing and the core: With reference to matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ostroy, Joseph M.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 558-573
• 关键词: Subdifferential; core; market game; assignment model; Walrasian equilibrium; Perfect substitutability

摘要

Lloyd Shapley's contributions with respect to the core are interpreted as subdifferentiability characterizations of the pricing of individuals that is similar to the pricing of commodities in economic models of exchange with transferable utility. Differentiability of the core is interpreted as perfect substitutability with respect to the pricing of individuals. Differentiability implies, but is not implied by, equivalence of the core and Walrasian equilibria. Differentiability eliminates opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of utilities. The assignment model with transferable utility is framed in the setting of exchange economies and its individual and commodity pricing is extended to non transferable utility. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.