An axiomatization of plays in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mathevet, Laurent
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.012
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 19-31
• 关键词: Conventions; axioms; Pattern mining; complexity; STABILITY; EVOLUTION; equilibrium selection

摘要

Suppose that, in repeated games, players eventually engage in a pattern of action profiles, which we call a convention. Do some conventions seem more plausible than others? We answer axiomatically based on the principles of stability and efficient simplicity. The main solution says that conventions should be constant repetitions of a static Nash equilibrium, or such that players switch between two Pareto unranked profiles (across which they each change action). In some repeated games, this reduces the multiplicity of outcomes and even leads to uniqueness. The paper also reports experimental evidence that supports our findings. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.