Balanced externalities and the Shapley value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McQuillin, Ben; Sugden, Robert
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 81-92
• 关键词: Shapley value; Balanced contributions; Merge-externalities; Semivalues; Coalitional bargaining

摘要

We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of 'undominated merge-externalities'. Similar to the well-known 'balanced contributions' characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to 'threat points' present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy 'balanced merge-externalities'. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games (including monotonic simple games), and also extends naturally to encompass games in partition function form. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.