Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Xiang
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-20
• 关键词: Indivisible object; priority; house allocation; Housing market; STABILITY; Group strategy-proofness

摘要

We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is generally not compatible with efficiency. We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient assignment always exists, as well as the priority structures that admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation problems and housing markets are two classic families of allocation problems that admit a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule, any priority-augmented allocation problem with more than three objects admits such a rule if and only if it is decomposable into a sequence of subproblems, each of which has the structure of a house allocation problem or a housing market. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.