How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellingsen, Tore; Ostling, Robert; Wengstrom, Erik
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University; Lund University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 153-181
• 关键词: Cheap talk; Pre-play communication; Noncooperative game theory

摘要

This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.