The conditions in the existence results for discontinuous games by Reny and by Simon and Zame are incomparable

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
• 署名单位: University of Surrey
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 16-19
• 关键词: Games with an endogenous sharing rule; discontinuous games; Existence of equilibrium

摘要

A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such that the payoff correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normal-form game whose mixed extension satisfies the assumptions in Reny (1999). We present a result showing that this is not so in general, even when the assumptions in Reny (1999) are weakened to those in Barelli and Meneghel (2013). (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.