Strategy-proof location of public facilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
• 署名单位: Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 21-48
• 关键词: Social choice rule; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; single-peaked preferences; Single-dipped preferences

摘要

Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.