The balanced contributions property for equal contributors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yokote, Koji; Kongo, Takumi; Funaki, Yukihiko
• 署名单位: Waseda University; Fukuoka University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 113-124
• 关键词: TU games; Balanced contributions property; Shapley value; Axiomatization

摘要

We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property (Myerson, 1980) to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.