Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jagadeesan, Ravi; Kominers, Scott Duke; Rheingans-Yoo, Ross
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 287-294
• 关键词: Matching; strategy-proofness; Lone wolf theorem; Rural hospitals theorem

摘要

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new Lone Wolf Theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is typically used in settings with discrete transfers. (C) 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.