Zero-sum revision games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gensbittel, Fabien; Lovo, Stefano; Renault, Jerome; Tomala, Tristan
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 504-522
• 关键词: Revision games; zero-sum games; Deadline effect

摘要

In zero-sum asynchronous revision games, players revise their actions only at exogenous random times. Players' revision times follow Poisson processes, independent across players. Payoffs are obtained only at the deadline by implementing the last prepared actions in the component game. We characterize the value of this game as the unique solution of an ordinary differential equation and show it is continuous in all parameters. As the duration of the game increases, the limit revision value does not depend on the initial position and is included between the min-max and max-min of the component game. We characterize the equilibrium for 2 x 2 games. When the component game min-max and max-min differ, the revision game equilibrium have a wait-and-wrestle structure: far form the deadline, players stay put at sur-place action profile, close to the deadline, they take best responses to the action of the opponent. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.