Communication with evidence in the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hagenbach, Jeanne; Perez-Richet, Eduardo
• 署名单位: Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 139-165
• 关键词: Sender-receiver game; hard evidence; information disclosure; Masquerade relation; Skepticism; Obvious dominance

摘要

We study a class of sender-receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.