Goal bracketing and self-control

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Hsiaw, Alice
署名单位:
Brandeis University
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.005
发表日期:
2018
页码:
100-121
关键词:
Choice bracketing goals reference dependence self-control Quasi-hyperbolic discounting optimal stopping
摘要:
This paper studies the role of goal bracketing to attenuate time inconsistency. When setting non-binding goals for a multi-stage project, an agent must decide how to group, or bracket, such goals for evaluation. He can bracket broadly by setting an aggregate goal for the entire project, or narrowly by setting incremental goals for individual stages. A loss averse agent brackets optimally by trading off motivation and risk pooling, which interacts non-trivially with time discounting. An aggregate goal becomes more attractive as early-stage uncertainty increases, while incremental goals become more attractive when later-stage uncertainty increases. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.