Credit auctions and bid caps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lagziel, David
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.010
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 416-422
• 关键词: Credit auctions; Defaulting; first-price auctions; Second-price auctions; Bid-caps

摘要

In this paper we offer two contributions to the field of credit auctions. First, we compare first- and second-price credit auctions and provide solvency-dependent conditions such that one mechanism dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs of all the parties involved. In addition, we present a new possibility of using bid caps in credit auctions. We study the equilibria in the capped mechanisms and show that bid caps can increase the seller's expected payoff and, in some cases, the expected payoffs of all sides (a win-win situation). (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.